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into a methodological comer. On the one hand, the author expertly explores 
a complex and largely unstudied form of monastic literature. On the other 
hand, however, the reader hovers so far above the provenance and general 
hermeneutic situation of the author's primary sources that it is often dif­
ficult to profit from Jansen’s indisputable erudition. In this sense, the book 
would benefit enormously from a case study or short series of case studies, 
which would give the reader an understanding of the general aspects of a 
chayik's style, structure, and content, as well as place these texts in a more 
holistic context relative to the author's use of oral history.
In conclusion, Berthe Jansen's The Monastery Rules offers an excellent 
specialist study of Tibetan Buddhist monasticism, which emphasizes indig­
enous voices and emic perceptions of monastic guidelines over the broader 
historical and cultural context in which monastic institutions thrived. While 
this approach is exemplary and often rewarding to read, aspects of the 
author's treatment of primary data and certain atypical authorial choices 
detract from the publication's heuristic value. Nevertheless, The Monastery 
Rules constitutes a monumental achievement that breaks new ground on an 
understudied but vitally important topic.
Japanese Philosophy in the Making 1: Crossing Paths with Nishida. By 
John C. Maraldo. Nagoya: Chisokudo Publications, 2017. 488 pages. Paper­
back: ISBN 978-1-9739-2956-7.
TANAKA JUN’ICHI
A RECONSIDERATION OF JAPANESE PHILOSOPHY
FROM AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
It is a great honor for me to write a review of John Maraldo’s Japanese 
Philosophy in the Making 1: Crossing Paths with Nishida. Maraldo is well 
known both as a scholar of Japanese philosophy, especially of the thought 
of Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), and as a distinguished philoso­
pher in his own right. It is indeed significant that a non-Japanese philosopher 
has published such a fine work on Japanese philosophy as for a long time 
Nishida's philosophy has been primarily studied by Japanese philosophers. 
The study of philosophy, though, should not be so geographically restricted 
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as it is fundamentally a universal pursuit and should be accessible to all 
people. Of course, Nishida's philosophy was constructed by a Japanese 
philosopher, but his thought should be understood as universal, and studied 
from an international perspective. However, Nishida's philosophy has often 
been misunderstood by philosophers in other parts of the world because he 
wrote only in Japanese. In addition, Nishida created new words that are dif­
ficult for even Japanese philosophers to understand. This partially explains 
why it has taken such a long time for good translations of Nishida’s work to 
appear in English and other languages.
Only when Nishida’s philosophy becomes recognized by philosophers 
throughout the world will his thought become “philosophy” in the original 
sense of the term. Philosophy should be accessible to anyone, not just to the 
people of a particular region. I am deeply grateful for, and greatly respect, 
the efforts of American and European philosophers to do research into 
Nishida's philosophy. I believe that such research into Japanese philosophy 
from a global standpoint will also help to enhance the quality of philosophy 
within Japan.
A CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK
The volume comprises thirteen unnumbered chapters, each of which is an 
original philosophical reflection stemming from Maraldo’s encounter with 
Nishida’s thought, and each is well worth reading. I will briefly explain the 
contents of each chapter.
Maraldo presents his fundamental standpoint in the opening chapter 
entitled “Japanese Philosophy as a Lens on Greco-European Thought.” As 
the Western philosophical tradition first developed in Greece, some phi­
losophers think that the origin of philosophy is to be found only in Greco- 
European Thought. Maraldo, however, argues that non-Westem thought has 
made significant contributions to European philosophy. Maraldo redefines 
philosophy as “a way of life” instead of “an argumentative discourse.” He 
then demonstrates that the thought of Japanese Buddhism and Confucian­
ism is embodied in such “ways of life.” In particular, he examines the 
teachings of Kukai (774-835), Saicho (767-822), Pure Land 
Buddhism, and Zen Buddhism. Maraldo then concludes that Japanese phi­
losophy can provide a lens on Greco-European thought precisely because 
each is fundamentally “a way of life.”
In “How Meiji-Era Japan Appropriated Philosophy from Europe,” 
Maraldo examines the history of Japanese philosophy in the Meiji era.
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First, he considers the roles and thought of enlightenment proponents such 
as Nishi Amane -17 (1829-1897), the Meiroku -A' (Meiji Six) group, 
and Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901). He pays especially close
attention to Kato Hiroyuki (1836-1916) and his ideas concern­
ing individual and human rights. He then discusses the thought of Inoue 
Tetsujiro (1856-1944) and Inoue Enryo 7 7 A (1858-1919).
Inoue Tetsujiro refashioned Confucian thought based upon Hegelian phi­
losophy and tried to define Eastern thought as “philosophy” (tetsugaku). 
Inoue Enryo promoted the notion of “pure philosophy” and stressed the 
import role of Buddhism, especially Huayan Buddhism, in this regard. 
Inoue Enryo’s thinking later influenced such important thinkers as Kuwaki 
Gen’yoku (1874-1946), Kiyozawa Manshi (1863-1903),
and Nishida Kitaro.
“Framing the Place and Significance of Nishida’s Philosophy in Europe 
and North America” examines Nishida’s philosophical influence on Europe 
and North America. The translation of Nishida’s works is admittedly dif­
ficult. Nevertheless, some European and American researchers believe 
that Nishida’s philosophy needs to be released from its original Japanese 
language in order to be properly examined. Five perspectives on Nishida 
are considered: (1) Nishida as Japan’s first philosopher, (2) Nishida as phi­
losopher of the East, (3) Nishida as Zen philosopher, (4) Nishida as founder 
of the Kyoto school, and (5) Nishida as national ideologue. Maraldo argues 
that European and North American philosophers may realize that they share 
much common interest with Nishida.
In “How Nishida Individualized Religion” Maraldo enumerates the vari­
ous influences upon Nishida’s religious philosophy, such as Zen Buddhism, 
Pure Land Buddhism, and Christianity. Although Nishida is generally 
thought to have been influenced by Zen, he did not directly identify religion 
with Zen. Nishida always disavowed mysticism and insisted on constructing 
a philosophical system. Maraldo here examines Nishida’s life in some detail. 
Though Nishida successfully passed his Zen kdan training, he was not 
satisfied with this result. While he certainly regarded “immediate experi­
ence” as most important, his own realization of “immediate experience” did 
not occur from this koan practice, but rather when he was a high school stu­
dent in Kanazawa. Maraldo then examines Nishida’s approach to religion, 
focusing upon two problems in particular: the socio-historical aspect of reli­
gion and the relationship between the individual and the nation.
“The Problem of World Culture: Appropriating Nishida’s Philosophy of 
Nation and Culture” is a chapter of particular interest that contains a great 
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deal of original thinking. Maraldo tries to read Nishida’s philosophy as a 
philosophy of culture, and argues that the latter’s philosophy has the poten­
tial to contribute to multicultural society. The nationalistic elements of his 
thinking, such as Japan-centrism, should of course be abandoned. Accord­
ing to Maraldo’s interpretation, Nishida foresaw our multicultural world, 
which consists of an array of ethnic groups. A true “world culture” may 
be formed from these various cultures. Nishida's ideas are similar in this 
regard to those of Charles Taylor. Nishida’s notion of “world culture” may 
be seen to some extent in contemporary multicultural nations.
In the essay “Self, World, and the Nothingness Underlying Distinctions,” 
the relationship between “self” and “world” is considered from the stand­
point of absolute nothingness. This problem is normally examined from the 
standpoint of extemalism and intemalism. Maraldo explains, however, that 
the self-aware, judging mind should not be abstracted from one’s concrete 
situation. Individuals create, and are created by, the historical world. This 
is then discussed from the standpoint of nothingness. In nothingness as 
the fundamental place, individual things and persons emerge as the “self­
determinations of nothingness” (p. 191). The making of distinctions occurs 
from the self-determination of nothingness. Making distinctions manifest is 
rooted in nothingness. Maraldo then makes a highly original argument dem­
onstrating a relationship between Nishida’s notion of “nothingness” and 
Zhuangzi’s notion of“obscurity.”
Maraldo discusses two main issues in his essay “Enaction in Cognitive 
Science and Nishida’s Turn of Intuition into Action.” The first concerns 
the problem of the translation of the term koi-teki chokkan He
presents various terms as possible translations, and then suggests the use 
of the term “enaction.” Second, he applies the notion of “enaction” to a 
new approach to understanding human cognition—that of Francisco Varela 
(1946-2001). For Nishida, knowing is not conceptual knowing but practi­
cal knowing. Thus, we do not know something in our consciousness, but in 
our actions. The relationship between the world and us is interactive. The 
historical world determines our action. It is for this reason that he adopts 
the term “enaction.” He then goes on to examine new aspects of cognitive 
science in light of this idea.
There are two key phrases in Nishida’s philosophy of time. One is “eternal 
now,” and the other is “absolute present.” In his chapter entitled “Nishida's 
Ontology of History,” Maraldo examines the decisive difference between 
these terms. In this context, he discusses the influence that Nishida’s stu­
dent, Tosaka Jun (1900-1945), had upon Nishida’s own thinking. 
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Nishida considered “eternal now” to be part of consciousness, existing in 
the flow of linear time. Tosaka criticized this idea, though, as being bour­
geois and not based on daily life. In response to this criticism, Nishida 
reconstructed his philosophy of time by presenting the notion of “absolute 
present,” which is contained in historical time. Here, time is not conceived 
of as a straight line, but rather as a round circle. In each temporal moment, 
the “absolute present” determines itself, and the present is not determined 
by the past but by the future.
In “Self-Mirroring and Self-Awareness: Dedekind, Royce and Nishida” 
Maraldo analyzes Nishida’s concept of self-awareness, comparing it to 
those of Richard Dedekind (1831-1916) and Josiah Royce (1855-1916). 
Maraldo first considers what Nishida thought about Dedekind’s definition 
of infinity, and then moves on to explore how Nishida attempted to address 
the problems he found therein by employing ideas from Royce. This effort 
prompted Nishida to devise his self-mirroring structure, which Maraldo 
probes at considerable depth. This notion became the basis for Nishida's 
concept of “place” (basho ^^). The relationship between judgment, 
intentional consciousness, and pure act is fundamental for understanding 
Nishida. This chapter deftly reveals how this structure of knowing is con­
structed and functions in Nishida's philosophy.
“What Phenomenologists Can Learn from Nishida about Self-Awareness” 
lays out the commonalities and differences between Nishida's philosophy 
and phenomenology, comparing in particular the thought of Nishida and 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Whereas Husserl conceived of the whole as 
transcendental subjectivity, Nishida thought all experience is in “conscious­
ness” or “pure experience.” Where Husserl's “I” is the stream of experience, 
Nishida’s “self’ is self-reflecting and conceived of as mirroring. Nishida’s 
consciousness does not imply a first-person perspective. Maraldo goes on to 
discuss the merits and defects of self-mirroring awareness in Nishida, and 
in so doing, produces engaging and original philosophical analysis.
Heidegger and Nishida were famous philosophers who discussed the 
meaning of “nothingness” and emphasized its importance. Moreover, Hei­
degger defined the history of philosophy as comprised of onto-theology, 
and Nishida regarded “the West” itself as “being.” But, as Maraldo points 
out, we must be aware of the differences between these philosophers, and 
it is precisely such differences that he examines in depth in “Heidegger 
and Nishida: Nothingness, God, and Onto-theology.” Nishida distinguishes 
being and nothingness, and regards nothingness as the ultimate place. The 
character of Nishida’s nothingness is “absolute” and includes both being 
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and “relative nothingness.” Heidegger, however, did not turn to nothing­
ness as a means to solve philosophical problems. Rather, Heidegger found a 
variation of “God” in the history of metaphysics, one in which God is trans­
formed to “Be-ing.”
“Nothing Gives: Marion and Nishida on Gift-giving and God” comprises 
an original comparison between the thought of Nishida and that of the 
French philosopher and Roman Catholic theologian, Jean-Luc Marion (b. 
1946). Marion’s definition of “God” is highly original. It differs from Hei­
degger’s in that it does not consider God in the context of onto-theology. 
Rather, Marion thinks of God as a “gift.” In particular, Maraldo examines at 
great length Marion’s understanding of God’s “love,” which is considered a 
“gift” that does not need any recipients. He then compares Nishida’s under­
standing of love—derived from the traditions of Buddhist thought—with 
that of Marion.
Maraldo examines the notion of “world” in the thought of Nishida and 
Heidegger in his essay “The Many Senses of the One World: Nishida’s and 
Heidegger’s Thought in the 1930s and the Environmental Crisis of Today.” 
Today, the world is often thought of as “one world” because of the interde­
pendent relationship between nations. Normally, the “world” is understood 
as the “natural world,” understood as being governed by the causal laws of 
physical nature. But Maraldo contrasts this naturalism with both Nishida’s 
“creative, historical world” and Heidegger’s understanding of “world.” 
Nishida explained the dynamic interaction between individuals and the 
world; Heidegger considered the creativity of the world from the perspec­
tive that it is the world itself that forms history. Maraldo thinks that “world” 
can be considered not only from the perspective of naturalism, but also 
from cultural and historical perspectives. In doing so, he emphasizes the 
continuing relevance of the thought of both Nishida and Heidegger to our 
present historical conditions.
PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF THIS VOLUME
I will focus on three aspects of Maraldo’s volume that are particularly note­
worthy, though there are indeed numerous other significant points that could 
be elaborated upon.
The Cultural andPolitical Significance ofNishida’sPhilosophy
First, Maraldo has clearly demonstrated that the theoretical framework 
of Nishida’s philosophy influenced not only the development of his epis­
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temology and ontology but the development of his cultural and political 
philosophy as well. His explanation of Nishida's transition from the con­
cept of “eternal now” to that of “absolute present” is particularly satisfy­
ing and illuminating, especially as this transition is so central to Nishida’s 
late cultural and political philosophy. Maraldo also lucidly demonstrates 
how Nishida's cultural and political philosophy developed vis-a-vis his 
interaction with his students. As is well known, Nishida turned his interest 
from transcendental problems to concrete problems because many of his 
students were fascinated with Marx. As mentioned above, Tosaka Jun espe­
cially impressed Nishida and had a profound influence upon him. Tosaka 
constructed his own philosophy of time on the basis of “everydayness.” 
According to Tosaka, everydayness is the universal structure of history. 
Tosaka criticized his teacher’s philosophy of time as being overly transcen­
dental and not based on daily life. The result, according to Tosaka, was a 
philosophy that is “bourgeois.”
Interestingly, Nishida did not reject Tosaka’s criticism. Instead, he deep­
ened his own philosophy by accepting and integrating Tosaka’s criticism 
within it. Nishida initiated radical developments to his philosophy in the 
first half of the 1930s. Maraldo nicely explains the connection between 
Nishida's theoretical philosophy and cultural philosophy in his account of 
the concept of “absolute present.” In doing so he reveals the decisive difier- 
ence between the concepts of “eternal now” and “absolute present.” In the 
“eternal now,” time is conceived as circular. Past and future vanish in the 
present. The present is eternal. This is the point of Tosaka’s criticism. Such 
an idea does not contain an historical standpoint. Based on this criticism, 
Nishida changed his fundamental framework.
In the “absolute present,” each present is determined by, and in, its 
context. The absolute present is indexical and determines itself in each 
moment. It is similar to a linguistic expression whose reference shifts 
according to context. The meaning of the absolute present is determined by 
its situation. So “present” encompasses pasts and futures and has historical 
meaning. The absolute present is similar to Tosaka’s everydayness. Accord­
ing to Nishida, the image of time is a circle without a center. Furthermore, 
the concept of “absolute present” is relevant to cultural and political phi­
losophy, especially to the problems of Japanese culture and the nation-state. 
Nishida's discourse leads to the admission that there is no nation as center 
in this world, but rather that each nation tries to identify its function as cen­
tral in its nation. Maraldo has convincingly demonstrated these connections 
between Nishida's theoretical and cultural philosophy.
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Applying Nishida's Philosophy to Modern Science and Current Problems
Second, Maraldo makes compelling connections between Nishida’s phi­
losophy and problems facing the contemporary world. Two of the essays 
in this volume do so in particularly explicit ways: “The Problem of World 
Culture: Appropriating Nishida’s Philosophy of Nation and Culture,” 
and “Enaction in Cognitive Science and Nishida’s Turn of Intuition into 
Action.” In the former essay, Nishida's philosophy of culture is applied to 
multicultural society. The commonplace understanding of Nishida’s philos­
ophy is that it is overly Japan-centric. Maraldo, however, does not reduce 
Nishida's discourse in this simplistic manner. Rather, he points to the pos­
sibilities for global culture that it contains. This does not mean, of course, 
that Maraldo ignores certain problematic elements in Nishida’s writings, 
such as his overly simplistic contrast between the “West” and the “East,” 
which ignores the complexities underlying each of these terms. In the same 
way, Nishida also reduced “Japan” to a homogenous unity, ignoring the 
multiplicity found within Japanese culture. Such criticisms should not be 
overlooked, and Maraldo does not do so. Nevertheless, Maraldo does point 
out that Nishida not only predicted the rise of our multicultural, multiethnic 
world, but believed that a true world culture would arise from the interac­
tion of a variety of cultures. Maraldo extrapolates from this idea and applies 
it to multicultural nations, substituting Nishida’s notion of “world culture” 
for the multicultural nation-state. In so doing, Maraldo proposes a way to 
think with Nishida in our present situation.
In the latter essay, Maraldo comes up with a highly original term to 
render koi-teki chokkan—a phrase that is central to Nishida's philosophy, 
yet notoriously difficult to translate. Maraldo’s choice, “enaction,” is not 
only consistent with Nishida's views, but also opens up rich possibilities 
for the application of Nishida’s philosophy to contemporary cognitive sci­
ence. Maraldo cites the new cognitive science of Francisco Varela, which 
describes the human body as historical, and the cognitive self as instru­
mental. In traditional science, scientists strived to ascertain truth capable 
of verification from a third-person perspective. However, new approaches 
in cognitive science such as Varela’s discuss truth from a first-person, phe­
nomenological perspective. In this view, all cognition is seen as grounded in 
action. The relationship between the knower and the world is thus expressed 
as “enacted.” This idea is extremely close to Nishida’s thoughts on episte­
mology in his later years, which likewise see knowing as being based on 
action (koi), with all knowledge arising from the interdependence of self 
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and world. It is this relation between self and world that is called “action.” 
Maraldo’s choice of the term “enaction” thus successfully captures this res­
onance between Nishida’s later thinking and new developments in cognitive 
science.
The Comparison of Nishida with Other Philosophers
Lastly, Maraldo’s method of explaining Nishida’s philosophy by means 
of comparisons with an array of other philosophers is highly effective. He 
compares Nishida’s thought not only with Western philosophers such as 
Heidegger and Marion, but also with Japanese thinkers like Inoue Enryo, 
Tosaka Jun, and Tanabe Hajime Hw (1889-1962), among others. His 
comparison of Nishida and Heidegger, discussed above, illustrates the rig­
orousness of Maraldo’s approach. He avoids easy identifications due to the 
use of similar terms—such as both Nishida and Heidegger’s use of “noth­
ingness”—and illuminates the nuanced differences in the ways terms such 
as these are employed. Likewise, his three-way comparison of Dedekind, 
Royce, and Nishida, also discussed above, not only sheds new light on the 
understanding ofNishida, but on that of the other thinkers as well.
Maraldo’s comparisons of Nishida with other Japanese philosophers is 
likewise instructive, as in the case of Tosaka Jun’s influence on Nishida 
mentioned above. “How Meiji-Japan Appropriated Philosophy from 
Europe” treats a number of significant thinkers from that period and enables 
us to better understand the overall flow of the history of philosophy in 
Japan. In particular, he examines in detail the roles of Inoue Tetsujiro and 
Inoue Enryo, two philosophers with a deep understanding of Western phi­
losophy who tried to construct original, modem philosophies that integrated 
aspects of Confucian and Buddhist thought. Maraldo’s sophisticated con- 
textualization of the efforts of these two thinkers helps us better understand 
Nishida's place in the history of philosophy in Japan.
Philosophy in its origin was conceived of as a universal endeavor. 
Nishida’s profound and extensive philosophical writings are not merely 
“Japanese” or for Japanese people alone. John Maraldo has done the philo­
sophical community a great service by situating Nishida’s thought within 
the broad global sweep of modem philosophy. His volume will aid contem­
porary philosophers worldwide—Japanese and otherwise—to build upon 
some of Nishida’s insights to create new ways of thinking that are relevant 
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to our contemporary age. Such endeavors no longer belong to a field known 
as “Japanese philosophy,” but rather, to the universal discipline of “philoso­
phy.”
A Soga Ryojin Reader. By Jan Van Bragt. Edited by Wamae Muriuki. Intro­
duction by Michael Conway. Nagoya: Chisokudo Publications, 2017. 566 
pages. Paperback: ISBN 978-1-9738-1208-1.
tsunoda yuichi
Soga Ryojin (1875-1971) is “arguably the most innovative
thinker in the history of modem Shin Buddhism,”1 yet his works are still 
unknown to non-Japanese readers interested in modem Japanese Shin Bud­
dhist thought. A Soga Rydjin Reader by Jan Van Bragt (1928-2007) is the 
first collection of English translations of Soga’s theses, essays, and lectures. 
This work finally gives English-language readers access to the creative 
nature ofSoga’s thought.
The translator, Jan Van Bragt, was the first acting director of the Nanzan 
Institute for Religion and Culture at Nanzan University in Nagoya, Japan. 
Moreover, he was a Catholic priest, who belonged to the Society of the 
Divine Word. He had dedicated himself to interreligious dialogue between 
Buddhism and Christianity for many years before he passed away in 2007. 
According to the foreword by James W. Heisig, Van Bragt had a deep affec­
tion for Soga, and worked on translating Soga Ryojin senshu 
(The Selected Works of Soga Ryojin)2 into English between 1989 and 2003. 
When Van Bragt passed away, he left behind “a trove of translations” (p. 
1). Subsequently, Wamae Muriuki edited Van Bragt’s notes into publishable 
form (p. 3), and the present volume is the result of these efforts.
Van Bragt’s translations have several features that are different from ordi­
nary academic translations. In the introduction to the book, Michael Conway 
notes that the content of the book is “a collection of partial translations and
1 Robert F. Rhodes, “Soga Ryojin: Life and Thought,” in Cultivating Spirituality: A Mod­
ern Shin Buddhist Anthology, eds. Mark L. Blum and Robert F. Rhodes (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 2011), p. 101.
2 Soga Ryojin, Soga Ryojin senshu, 12 vols., ed. Soga Ryojin Senshu Kankokai 'm'-AuuT 
SftWvA (Tokyo: Yayoi Shobo, 1970-72).
